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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of alternate health care delivery and reimbursement
mechanisms, particularly those known as "Preferred Provider Organizations"
(PPOs)', raise a multitude of legal issues. Each PPO will exist in different market
conditions and .under different state laws. Therefore, while this Article seeks
to identify and discuss the legal issues, it cannot provide definitive answers.
This Article can, however, serve as a guideline or checklist for PPO analysis
and provide recommendations and alternatives for dealing with the legal
roadblocks that occur in the formation and operation of PPOs. This discussion
will be general in nature and cannot substitute for legal advice regarding any
particular factual situations encountered.
II. ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS
The emergence of alternative mechanisms such as PPOs represents one in-
novative response to the competitive and financial pressures currently experienc-
ed by health care providers. As a result of the new economic pressures and the
new approaches designed to counter those pressures, the health care industry
has witnessed increased activity in the area of antitrust litigation. These
challenges arise when existing business enterprises form new cooperative business
ventures.
Alternative delivery systems, including PPOs, are composed of independent
providers who are traditionally competitors or potential competitors. These com-
petitors or potential competitors are now combining in cooperative business
ventures. The formation of cooperative business ventures among competitors
will result in careful scrutiny by other business entities and by federal and state
governments who might view the combination as an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of antitrust laws. Antitrust challenges are costly to defend.
Under civil law, the risks of being found in violation of the antitrust laws are
heightened by the possibility of treble damages and, under criminal law, by
possible fines and imprisonment. This area requires careful analysis by those
considering the establishment of a PPO.
I Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) are organized systems of health care pro-
viders, operating through contracts with payors (such as employers, insurers, or union
trust funds), to provide comprehensive health care services to subscribers, generally on
a fee-for-service basis. Incentives are provided to patients and payors to utilize PPO
member physicians and hospitals. In turn, the providers anticipate the ability to main-
tain or increase their market share of patients. See generally D. COWEN, PREFERRED PRO-
VIDER ORGANIZATIONS 3-11 (1984). See also Larson, Do PPOs Practice Quality Medicine?,
25 PHYSICIAN'S MGMT. 297 (1985).
Although PPOs are frequently confused with Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), there are significant differences. In general, an HMO is a system of health care
delivery and financing which provides health services to voluntarily controlled members
who pay a fixed annual or periodic fee. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICE (1980). For a definition of a federally qualified HMO
see 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1976).
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A. Antitrust Statutes
The Sherman Antitrust Act 2 provides the principal basis for antitrust scrutiny
of PPOs. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, agreements, com-
binations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade. The courts have found such
restraints to include price fixing, 3 group boycotts, 4 tying arrangements, 5 divi-
sion of markets,6 and customer allocation. 7 Section 2 of the Sherman Act pro-
scribes monopolization as well as attempts and conspiracies to monopolize.
Violation of the Sherman Act is a felony and carries a fine of up to $100,000
or imprisonment for up to three years for an individual, and a fine of up to
$1 million for a corporation. Civil remedies under the Act include treble damages
to a private claimant, punitive damages, recovery of plaintiff's costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees, and injunctive relief. 8
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 9 prohibits unfair methods
of competition, which have been held to encompass not only all Sherman Act
and Clayton Antitrust Act"0 violations but also any restraint of trade contrary
to the policy and spirit of those laws. 1
The Clayton Act is less likely to pose problems for PPO formation, as most
of its provisions relate to sales of commodities rather than to the provision of
services as generally contemplated by PPOs. Nevertheless, any PPO must be
analyzed in light of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 12 which governs mergers, ac-
quisitions, and joint ventures in restraint of trade.
State antitrust statutes are frequently analogous to federal antitrust laws with
respect to the practices they prohibit and the penalties imposed. Some state anti-
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (original version at Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)).
' Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 267 (1978) (a finding that the price fixing agreement is ancillary to an integra-
tion of productive capacity may save a particular practice from per se proscription).
4 Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
5 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, _ U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 1551
(1984); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
6 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See also United States v.
Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,892 (5th Cir. 1978); L. A.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 225 (1977).
' White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 162 (1976).
1 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
9 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982) (original version at Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914)).
10 15 U.S.C. § 13 (original version at Ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
11 See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (rejecting notion that FTC only
had power to prohibit outright violations of Clayton or Sherman Acts, where defen-
dant had effectively foreclosed its competitors from shoe market).
12 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
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trust statutes, however, have different requirements and govern different con-
duct than do the federal laws. 13
B. Federal Antitrust Jurisdiction
Prior to the consideration of an antitrust complaint under federal law, a court
must determine if a defendant's activity falls within the federal jurisdictional
requirements. An antitrust complaint must contain allegations that the plain-
tiff's business is in, or affects, interstate commerce and that either the defen-
dant's general business activity or the specific challenged activity substantially
affects interstate commerce. Traditionally, health care providers and members
of the "learned professions" successfully argued that their business or practices
were local in character and that any effect on interstate commerce was inciden-
tal and remote. 14 Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, many involving
health care providers, indicate that a defense based on the absence of impact
on interstate commerce may not exempt conduct from federal antitrust statutes.15
C. Methods of Case Analysis
The Supreme Court has held that, while most restraints of trade must be
analyzed in terms of the nature, purpose, and effect of the restraint, some types
of restraints are so inimical to competition and so unjustified that they are con-
clusively presumed to be illegal. These restraints are called per se violations.
They require no inquiry into their effect on competition or their business justifica-
tion. Per se violations include price fixing, group boycotts, division of markets,
and tying arrangements. 16
In situations where restraints of trade other than per se violations are involved,
the legal analysis follows the rule of reason approach. The rule of reason tests
an alleged restraint of trade to determine whether it promotes, suppresses, or
13 In Texas, for example, an illegal trust is defined as a combination of capital, skill,
or acts by two or more persons to "fix, maintain, increase or reduce the ... cost of
insurance ... "TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. Art. 15.02(b)(2) (Vernon 1968). Unless
this provision were construed to refer only to the price of insurance premiums, a PPO
could be held to violate the terms of this statut6. Texas courts have not construed this
provision so narrowly, applying the prohibition to any combination that affects insurance
costs. See Commercial Standard, Inc. v. Board of Ins., 34 S.W.2d 343 (1931). The Texas
law serves as an example of why creators of PPOs must consult and comply with the
antitrust laws of each state in which the PPO or its member organizations do business
or, in the case of physicians, each state in which they are licensed to practice medicine.
14 E.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1952).
Is See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Cardio-Medical Assoc. v. Crozer-Chester
Medical Center, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd in part, 721 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.
1983).
16 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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destroys competition. The court considers the facts peculiar to the challenged
activity, the nature of the restraint and its probable effect on competition, and
other relevant information necessary to determine whether the conduct is, in
fact, anticompetitive. 17 The courts have not established a special standard for
the analysis of the activities of health care providers.
D. Potential Substantive Antitrust Violations
1. Price Fixing
Inherent in the formation of most PPOs is the creation of contractual ar-
rangements among physicians, hospitals, payors, and employers. These
agreements raise the concern that they could be viewed under antitrust theory
as evidence of concerted activity among competing or potentially competing
entities. These activities may be viewed as restricting price, quality, or service
in an anticompetitive manner. The antitrust issue most frequently raised when
analyzing a PPO is the claim that the participating providers are engaged in
illegal price fixing. As noted earlier, price fixing is per se unlawful. Price fixing
may be found in agreements to charge uniform prices, set minimum or max-
imum prices, employ uniform discount or credit policies, or share pricing
information.
The Supreme Court, however, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc.18 and other cases, has indicated that the per se rules does
not necessarily apply to each instance of literal price fixing among competitors.
The Court has distinguished between agreements whose predominant purpose
is the suppression of price competition and those in which the price restraint
is incidental to some otherwise valid business purpose. Therefore, the method
by which a restraint is characterized is crucial. Those agreements found to be
"naked" price fixing arrangements are unlawful per se, where agreements in
which price restraint is "ancillary" to a valid purpose are judged under the rule
of reason. Rule of reason analysis permits courts to determine whether an ar-
rangement tends to promote competition despite the existence of a price restraint.
Thus, PPO agreements which satisfy the Broadcast Music predominant - pur-
pose test will possibly be analyzed under the more-easily-met rule of reason
standard.
The Supreme Court also considered in two recent cases the possibility that
a traditional per se analysis might not be applied to members of the learned
professions. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Court, in dicta, advanced
the possibility that the professions may be "treated differently" than other oc-
cupations; 19 in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,20
the Court noted that professional services "differ significantly from other business
" Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
18 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
19 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
20 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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services. "21 Nevertheless, the holdings in these cases indicate that at least price
fixing activities by the learned professions would be scrutinized under the per
se rule.
The extent of these decisions was subject to debate after the Supreme Court
decided Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,22 Maricopa involved
agreements among physician members of medical care foundations to accept
no more than predetermined maximum prices as full payment for services
rendered to policyholders of foundation-approved insurance plans. The Court
held that such agreements were per se price fixing violations.
In Maricopa, organizations composed of and controlled by seventy percent
of the physicians in the geographic area canvassed their members to determine
what would constitute an acceptable fee schedule. This market dominance, while
not relied upon by the Court, is noteworthy. It enabled these competitors "to
sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and arguably to affect the
prevailing market price of medical care."2 3 The restraint was not "ancillary"
to a valid arrangement but rather "fit squarely in a horizontal price fixing
mold. 24
The Court rejected the defendants' arguments that the public service and pro-
fessional aspects of health care delivery entitled them to a special exemption
from the per se standard. The Court was not persuaded that a different stan-
dard should be applied because "cost containment" was an objective of the
agreements. 25 It found the fixing of maximum prices to be as objectionable as
the fixing of minimum prices. "In this case, the rule is violated by a price restraint
that tends to provide the same economic rewards to all practitioners, regardless
of their skill, their experience, their training, or their willingness to employ in-
novative and difficult procedures in individual cases." 26
A careful review of the Maricopa decision and its underlying facts, however,
suggests that not all agreements that have price fixing components will inevitably
be subject to the per se standard. In Maricopa the Court could not find a way
in which the scheme would enhance competition or foster efficient service. The
fee arrangements in Maricopa were not ancillary to any other lawful founda-
tion activities. The foundation did not sell insurance or otherwise market health
care services, nor were the fee schedules essential to other foundation activities,
such as utilization review or claims administration. They merely established
a price schedule to be followed by existing insurers in paying providers, with
no resultant procompetitive effect. Further, the arrangement in Maricopa was
not established to permit competing practitioners to offer a product different
from the product which could be offered absent the combination agreement;
neither did it provide for capital pooling and risk sharing by the competitors,
as in a partnership or joint venture. Instead, the Court found that
11 Id. at 696."
22 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
23 Id. at 356.
24 Id. at 357.
25 Id. at 351 (cost containment was an objective of the agreements).
26 Id. at 348.
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the combination has merely permitted [the physicians] to sell their ser-
vices to certain customers at fixed prices and arguably to affect the
prevailing market price of medical care ... The agreement ... is [one]
among hundreds of competing doctors concerning the price at which
each will offer his own services to a substantial number of consumers.2 7
The Maricopa decision suggests a business organization spectrum. At one
end of the spectrum is the professional corporation (i.e., of physicians), at the
other end is the entity in Maricopa. Professional corporations, by statutory
definition, pool capital and share risks. The Maricopa entity, however, did not
pool capital, or share the risks of the venture. Its price fixing was a naked
restraint, not ancillary to any other lawful activites. Significantly, the Court
stated that
each of the foundations is composed of individual practitioners who
compete with one another for patients. Their combination . . . does
not permit them to sell any different product. The foundations are not
analogous to ... other joint arrangements in which persons who would
otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the risks . 2
For a cooperative business venture to avoid per se antitrust analysis and fall
within the purview of the rule of reason, it must resemble a traditional business
entity as much as possible. The cooperative business venture should be establish-
ed to offer a different, better product than that offered by the participants in-
dividually, and the participants should pool capital and share the risks of the
venture.
It is not yet clear what ultimate effect Maricopa will have on PPOs and other
alternate health care provider arrangements in analyzing antitrust issues in
general and traditional per se violations in particular. The Court forcefully re-
jected arguments for carving out an exception to per se treatment merely because
of the unique nature of the health care industry.2 9 These points suggest an ex-
pansive reading of Maricopa in assessing its application to the health care in-
dustry and to PPOs specifically.
On the other hand, the case was decided by a narrow 4-3 margin, with three
vigorous dissents. Most significantly, the business organization in Maricopa dif-
fers markedly from that of a properly crafted PPO. Using the guidance provid-
ed in Maricopa, PPOs, if organized as cooperative business ventures between
hospitals or hospital groups and members of their medical staffs, may minimize
antitrust exposure if they structure the venture substantially as follows:
- the participants pool their capital and share the risk of loss in the venture;
27 Id. at 355-57.
29 Id. at 357.
29 The Maricopa defendants failed to convince the Court of the validity of their
position by arguing that the industry is relatively removed from the competitive model,
is the object of statutory and voluntary cost containment efforts, is an industry with
which the judiciary has had little antitrust experience, and which is composed of profes-
sions historically immune from such a high degree of antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 348-50.
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- each participant has the opportunity to profit from the venture;
- the PPO does not include a high proportion of area physicians;
- the ultimate authority to set the fee schedule is in the hands of the
cooperative business venture and not the physicians;
- the cooperative business venture is not subject to unilateral control by the
physician competitors;
- the PPO physician fee component of the total discount package is negotiated
by the PPO separately with each buyer.
If a PPO is so structured, it appears to avoid the pitfalls of Maricopa. Fur-
ther, if the PPO is a new and perhaps better entrant in the health care delivery
market and exhibits these characteristics, the price arrangements that accom-
pany the formation and operation of the PPO will probably be viewed as an-
cillary in nature and subject to examination under the rule of reason.
2. Group Boycotts; Refusals to Deal
A second potential basis for antitrust liability is the theory of the group
boycott or concerted refusal to deal. A refusal to deal arises where an entity
is deprived of suppliers, customers, or other essential trade relationships by con-
certed action among other entities designed to keep the target from competing
in the marketplace. Such activity is generally viewed as a per se violation of
the antitrust laws. 30
Group boycotts must be distinguished from unilateral refusals to deal. A
unilateral refusal to deal is a decision by only one person or entity. Such a refusal
has been held to be lawful provided it is not in furtherance of any other an-
ticompetitive purpose and is supported by legitimate business reasons. 31 Never-
theless, even unilateral refusals to deal may be unlawful. In United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 32 Parke, Davis claimed it did no more than maintain resale
prices solely through unilateral refusals to deal with noncomplying customers.
The Court, however, reviewing a panoply of actions designed to coerce resale
price maintenance, concluded that Parke, Davis had embarked on a program
to "effect adherence to his resale prices .... [forming] a combination [among
itself and complying customers] in violation of the Sherman Act. " 33
Many group refusals to deal are upheld upon a finding that the refusal is in-
tended to advance the group's economic interests and not to adversely affect
competition. In such cases, where an exclusionary intent is not apparent and
the restrictive result is ancillary to the valid business purpose, the courts tend
to employ a rule of reason approach. 34 The most likely source of a group boycott
claim is a provider excluded or terminated from membership in the PPO.
30 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
31 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd. v. Joe E. Seagram & Sons, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
32 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
33 Id. at 44.
34 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, - U.S. , 104
S. Ct. 1551 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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However, the PPO may exclude or terminate a provider so long as the PPO
contracts define objective standards and reasons for termination or nonappoint-
ment and the motive for such exclusion is not anticompetitive. 35 The guidelines
for such provisions should be based on objective criteria other than economic
concerns and should be the least restrictive alternative available to accomplish
the PPO's legitimate goals. Articulated and consistently applied criteria such
as quality of care or the physical limitations of the PPO and its institutional
members should survive judicial scrutiny. For example, credentials requirements
may be applied in selecting PPO participants if the intent and effect of the re-
quirements are to ensure the efficient rendering of quality patient care and the
availability of necessary medical services. 36 Restrictions pertaining to the number
of physicians permitted to participate in the PPO may be established if the
physical structure of the PPO is self-limiting, or if the hospital(s) involved in
the PPO can only service a limited volume of patients.37
PPO market share in each health care delivery market will determine whether
a refusal to deal is so anticompetitive that it must be analyzed under the per
se rule. The greater the PPO's market share, the more sentitive the PPO must
be in establishing objective criteria for excluding or terminating physicians. If
a PPO possesses a substantial majority of the market (e.g., if sixty percent of
the patients in the service area are subscribers, or if seventy-five percent of the
admitting hospitals are members) and it is clear that there is tangible economic
benefit to participation in the PPO, exclusion or termination of providers from
the PPO will be scrutinized more closely. In such a situation, the exclusion must
be carefully supported by objective criteria set forth in the PPO contractual
arrangement to insure that the overall effect of such provisions are not
anticompetitive.
Practical measures that should be considered in avoiding antitrust liability
for concerted refusals to deal include: 1) objective standards for the appoint-
ment of providers to the PPO; 2) comprehensive due process protections for
providers challenging exclusions or terminations from the PPO. Such process
should include the right to notification of a denial, an explanation of the reasons
for denial, the right to a hearing, and a decision on the record of the hearing
examiner or committee; and 3) a vote by a nonbiased hearing examiner or,
preferably, a vote by a committee composed of individuals other than poten-
tial competitors of the provider under scrutiny. 38 Conversely, the criteria should
31 Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1981).
31 See Robinson v. Magovem, 521 F. Supp. 842, 844-46 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd,
688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
37 See Deeson v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Amer., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 846 (1966) (professional association entitled to adopt reasonable measures
to restrict size, although required to treat participants in same category equally).
31 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). Antitrust implications
arise from failing to inform applicants of evaluation criteria, even if objective. An ap-
plicant who has access to inside information about the application process, or who is
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not function to exclude, for example, entire classes of licensed primary care pro-
viders such as osteopaths 3 9 nor should it condition PPO membership on
membership in a particular professional association. Proper written contracts,
procedures, memoranda, and communications are essential in establishing the
absence of an anticompetitive motive.
Recent cases have indicated that even where competitors of the excluded
provider-selected provider members, the rule of reason dictates that no
cognizable boycott claim arises when competitors are merely denied equal ac-
cess to a PPO41
The relative market share of the entity that excludes the practicing profes-
sional is also significant. 42 One traditional antitrust theory holds that an other-
wise defensible activity may be found to be an unlawful concerted refusal to
deal where a market is so small that denying access to a facility is tantamount
to closing the market to the applicant.3 This so-called essential facilities doc-
trine provides, in essence, that where facilities cannot practically be duplicated
by would-be competitors, those in possession must allow the facilities to be
shared on fair terms. It is an illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the use of
a scarce facility. An essential facility is not necessarily defined as indispensible.
It is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and
if the denial of access will inflict a severe handicap on a potential market en-
trant.44
Thus, practices that have the effect of excluding providers from PPO par-
ticipation will not always result in group boycott violations. Where the PPO
already familiar with it, will have an advantage over one not privy to such informa-
tion. Any action failing to accord procedural safeguards may result in the imposition
of liability. In such a case, the court will not inquire into the reasons behind the organiza-
tion's decision. Instead, the court will rely on the well-settled "recognition that the ac-
cording of fair procedures is of fundamental significance, that serious and irreversible
economic injury may result from their denial," id. at 365, and that any later review of
the substantive basis of the decision cannot adequately establish what the outcome would
have been absent the unfair process. Id. See also, Robinson, 521 F. Supp. at 896-97 and
916-17; Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
19 See Weiss v. York Hosp., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
40 See Boddiker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 680 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 837 (1982).
41 Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that standards of ethical and professional responsibility
should be governed by the rule of reason absent a showing of minimal indicia of an-
ticompetitive purpose. Id. at 546. Crucial to the defense of the professional standards
for selection would be the genuineness of the justification, the reasonableness of these
standards themselves and the manner of their enforcement. However, actions of coer-
cion or intimidation that extend beyond the professional standards should not be governed
by the rule of reason but rather by the per se rule. Id. at 547.
42 Id.
43 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); L.A. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST 131 (1977).
44 See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 956 (1978). But see Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(doctrine expressly rejected in context of denial of hospital staff privileges).
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does not possess excessive market power, liability may be avoided. Further,
if the purpose of the rejection of certain providers is not to exclude those pro-
viders from essential trade relationships, a group boycott may not exist. The
expansion of business opportunities, promotion of efficiency, and enhancement
of professional competency of the PPO through its member professionals are
all permissible motives for practices whose effects are exclusionary.
3. Exclusive Dealing
Agreements between providers and PPOs may give rise to an additional an-
titrust violation commonly referred to as exclusive dealing. Exclusive dealing
arrangements ordinarily arise in situations in which a supplier of a product (e.g.,
the provider or PPO) prohibits a purchaser (e.g., the PPO or payor, respec-
tively) from handling competing products. Conversely, it may also occur where
the purchaser (PPO) prohibits the supplier (provider) from performing services
for other purchasers. Generally, exclusive dealing contracts have been viewed
by the courts as governed by the rule of reason standard unless the exclusive
dealing is in furtherance of some other restraint of trade. Factors such as the
duration of the contract and the extent of the foreclosure of the competitive
market have been deemed significant in assessing the legality of the arrange-
ment.45
In the PPO context, the issue of exclusive dealing arrangements may be rais-
ed where a PPO contractually prohibits a provider from dealing with other
health care delivery systems. These arrangements are generally considered to
be without a significant purpose other than diminishing competition and, as
such, tend to be viewed as per se violations of antitrust law. Of more concern
is the more common practice of a PPO or PPO-related organization entering
into an exclusive agreement with one or a limited number of providers or pro-
vider groups to the exclusion of other providers. This situation has been discussed
in terms of the objective criteria that should be applied to such decisions.
However, the factual context also raises the possibility that such agreements
are exclusive arrangements in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Numerous courts have found that such exclusive arrangements, at least in the
hospital context, are permissible under the rule of reason analysis. The courts
have held that the anticompetitive effect of excluding providers who have not
contracted with the hospital is outweighed by the benefits of efficiency,
availability, and responsiveness; such decisions recognize that considerations
45 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961) (deter-
mination must involve type of goods and degree of market foreclosure in relation to
market size); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (finding that com-
petition has been foreclosed and a substantial share of commerce affected satisfies re-
quirement that contract substantially reduced competition).
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related to economics and the quality of care may be more effectively addressed
through the exclusive arrangement.6
Once again, the creators of a PPO must be mindful of the danger underlying
such exclusive arrangements. Once the market share foreclosed by the exclusive
arrangements reaches a critical level in the view of a court, the arrangement
will be more closely scrutinized for potential anticompetitve effects. 41 Similar-
ly, where a PPO establishes an exclusive contract or such an agreement is made
by all or a substantial majority of admitting hospitals, or by one group prac-
tice of specialists, an excluded provider of that specialty may be successful in
alleging unlawful exclusive dealing since the market share circumscribed by the
arrangement could be substantial.
4. Monopolization
Section 2 of the Sherman Act sets forth three separate offenses regarding
monopolies: monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to
monopolize. Unlike section 1, which requires an agreement between separate
entities to establish a violation, section 2 creates liability for acts undertaken
by one entity alone. Claims against a PPO and its member provider institu-
tions alleging all three section 2 offenses may be made by physicians and other
practitioners who are denied access to hospital facilities by virtue of termina-
tion or denial of staff privileges. The excluded practitioner might attempt to
show that the PPO and its members have monopolized, attempted to
monopolize, or conspired to monopolize that practioner's speciaJty area by refus-
ing to provide access to hospital or PPO member facilities.
PPO agreements which prevent providers from joining other PPOs, or re-
quire providers to use PPO facilities for medical services that can be performed
outside the PPO member institutions, could raise questions of the PPO's
monopolization or attempted monopolization of the market for those services.
The antitrust result in these circumstances would depend on the PPO's ability
to demonstrate that the exclusionary act is justified by some independent pro-
competitive interest and is not the result of monopolization or an attempt to
monopolize the market for those services. 48
46 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, __ U.S. ., 104
S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Dos Santos v. Columbus Cuneo-Cabrini
Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1982); Harron v. United Hosp. Center Inc.,
522 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
47 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (196 1) (coal requirements
contract for $128 million over 20 years not unlawful); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (exclusive arrangement foreclosing 65% of oil market
unlawful).
48 The current test for monopolization is that the entity under scrutiny "(1) possess
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willfully acquire or maintain that power
as distinguished from its growth or development as a consequence of a superior pro-
duct, business acumen or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 570-71 (1976). An attempt to monopolize requires a specific intent to do so, and
the fact that the defendant has come dangerously near to achieving the unlawful
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Increasing market share by making participation in an arrangement more at-
tractive than nonparticipation does not imply a specific intent to monopolize. 49
Whatever percentage share of the market a PPO gains by such agreements is
not in itself sufficient to establish the requisite specific intent for an attempt
to monopolize.
E. Possible Antitrust Defenses
1. Learned Professions Exemption
Participation in a "learned profession" was a ground for antitrust immunity
until the Supreme Court's decisions in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 0 and
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,- which held pro-
fessionals to the same standards as other commercial entities for antitrust pur-
poses. It is abundantly clear that the health care industry and its various com-
ponents are no longer immune from antitrust scrutiny. Supreme Court deci-
sions have made it plain that courts are no longer reluctant to intrude into the
activities of the learned professions and their associations and organizations.
2. State Action Exemption
The Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown5 2 held that a state's raisin marketing
program that restricted competition was not covered by the antitrust laws. The
Court stated that the Sherman Act prohibited individual acts, not state acts.5 3
After Parker, courts generally applied a blanket antitrust exemption to activities
dictated by or closely regulated by the states. Recent decisions, however, have
limited Parker's application. In Goldfarb, the Court held that a bar associa-
tion's minimum fee schedules were illegal, rejecting the state action defense.
The Court determined that although the Supreme Court of Virginia regulated
the practice of law, it had not acted specifically to fix fees.5 4 In Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 5 5 the Court held that Detroit Edison illegally had tied sales of elec-
tricity and light bulbs. The Court rejected the argument that since the provi-
sion of free light bulbs was approved by the state, the practice was thereby
exempt as state action. Most recently, in Community Communications Co. v.
monopolization. Lorain Journal v. United States, 3,42 U.S. 143, 153 (1951). A substan-
tial amount of one element often substitutes for a lesser quantity of the other element
under both monopolization, see, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416,
429-33 (2d Cir. 1945), and an attempt to monopolize, Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327
F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
49 Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1981) (PPO's agreed
discount rate can be marketing device to increase market share, not strategy to destroy
competitors).
50 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
5" 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
52 317 U.S. 307 (1943).
51 Id. at 351-52.
14 421 U.S. at 788-89.
5 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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City of Boulder,5 6 the Supreme Court held that the state action doctrine does
not extend to municipal subdivisions. In that case the Court stated that the state
action doctrine exempts only conduct engaged in as an act of government, or
acts undertaken pursuant to state policy where the state policy is "clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed."57
Despite the limits, the state action exemption to antitrust law has continuing
validity, especially with regard to the delivery of health care services. Providing,
reducing, or expanding health care services is pervasively regulated by state
and federal law and agency rule. For example, state Certificate of Need (CON)
laws and state acts under the National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act of 19740 enable states to enact their legitimate interests in the delivery
of health care services. Recent cases have held or suggested that the state ac-
tion defense may be available in a variety of circumstances. For example, in
Phoenix Baptist Hospital & Medical Center v. Samaritan Health Services,59 par-
ticipation by a competitor hospital in CON hearings, pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy and an actively supervised regulatory scheme, constituted
state action rendering its activities immune from antitrust scrutiny. In Gam-
brel v. Kentucky Board of Dentistry,60 the dental association refused to give
denture prescriptions and laboratory work orders directly to patients where such
action was prohibited by state law under its valid exercise of police power. This
conduct was found to be exempt from antitrust scrutiny based on the state ac-
tion exemption. This line of cases provides support for the proposition that a
PPO will be exempt from antitrust review under the state action exemption if
it was created pursuant to a clearly articulated state mandate, evidenced by
a pervasive regulatory scheme, or where the activities of the PPO are regulated
pursuant to state law, policy, or rules such as CON regulations.
Health planning laws and regulations, however, do not create a blanket an-
titrust immunity for the planning and CON processes. The Supreme Court, in
National Gerimedical Hospital v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,61 reviewed the
actions of defendant Blue Cross, which refused membership to the complain-
ing hospital because the hospital had not obtained a certificate of need for its
construction. Blue Cross based its defense on antitrust immunity provided under
the health planning laws. The Supreme Court held that the planning act granted
no such immunity and that Blue Cross would have to defend the antitrust charges
on the merits. The Court, reiterating the rule expressed in Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange,62 stated that where, for example, a state health planning agency
has expressly urged a form of cost-saving cooperation among providers, an-
titrust immunity may be "necessary to make the [National Health Planning Act]
56 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
5' Id. at 52 (emphasis added). See also City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410-13 (1978).
" 42 U.S.C. § 300(K) (1982).
59 668 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3096 (1983).
60 689 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208 (1983).
61 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
62 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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work. 6 3 It restated the congressional intent that state health planning agencies
and providers who voluntarily work together to carry out the state's health plan-
ning statutory mandate should not be subject to antitrust laws. The Court
distinguished National Gerimedical, however, because the conduct at issue was
found not to be cooperation among providers, but rather merely an insurer's
refusal to deal with a provider that had failed to heed the advice of a state health
planning agency. 6
4
Relying on National Gerimedical, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in Huron Valley Hospital Inc. v. City of Pontiac,61 refused to dismiss an
antitrust suit charging that a competitor hospital had captured the CON pro-
cess and caused denial of plaintiff's application for approval of new construc-
tiori.66 The plaintiff alleged that the competitor hospital in the target communi-
ty blocked approval of the needed CON and manipulated the administrative
process to obtain a license for itself and rebuild its existing hospital. The Huron
Valley decision reversed a lower court determination 61 that the national health
planning laws provided state action antitrust immunity. The Sixth Circuit
established that the mere existence of a CON process does not provide an ex-
emption from the antitrust laws to entities that use or are required to participate
in the process. Rather, it is the mandated activities arising out of such regulatory
schemes that provide state action immunity from antitrust scrutiny with respect
to the practices of those entities that would otherwise be deemed violations of
antitrust law.
North Carolina v. P.I.A. Ashville, Inc. 6 is instructive in connection with
the application of both the implied repeal69 and state action doctrines to health
planning laws. At the initial trial stage, a defense based upon the state action
doctrine was successful, as the court held that a hospital merger is immune from
antitrust liability where the state has granted a CON for such merger following
due process hearings pursuant to its regulatory powers. A three-judge appellate
court panel originally affirmed the lower court decision.
However, after a rehearing en banc, the trial court decision was reversed and
remanded for a new trial. The Fourth Circuit found that while the CON re-
quirements constituted a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy, there was no active state supervision due to an absence of any monitor-
ing of the use of the hospital acquisition after its consummation.7
The status of the state action exemption with regard to health care providers
remains unclear in the wake of seemingly inconsistent decisions in Samaritan
63 Id. at 357.
64 452 U.S. at 393.
65 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
66 Id. at 1031.
67 Huron Valley Hosp. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (1979).
68 1982-2 Trade Cas. ff 64,764 (W.D. N.C. 1981), aff'd, 722 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1983),
rev'd and remanded after hearing en banc, 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984), pet. for cert.
filed, No. 84-480, 53 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Sept. 24, 1984).
69 See infra text accompanying notes 72-93.
70 740 F.2d at 277-79.
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Health Services, Gambrel, Huron Valley and P.I.A. Ashville. While courts have
not entirely repudiated a state action immunity for health care provider activities,
those activities must be essentially compelled by a state regulatory or statutory
scheme and the intent underlying that scheme. In an effort to resolve this uncer-
tainty, a petition for certiorari has been filed with the Supreme Court in P.I.A.
Ashvville.71
3. The Doctrine of Implied Repeal
Closely related to the state action theory is the doctrine of implied repeal.
This doctrine provides that where two legislative actions are inconsistent, the
subsequent act implicitly repeals the prior act to the extent of the inconsisten-
cy. 72 Antitrust immunity may be implied if a subsequent legislative act is deemed
to conflict with certain aspects of antitrust law. It is critical to note, however,
that "[i]mplied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be justified only by
a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the
regulatory system." 73 "Only where there is a 'plain repugnancy between the an-
titrust and regulatory provisions' will repeal be implied. 74 "Repeal is to be
regarded as implied only if necessary to make the . . .,[subsequent law] work
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."75 Health care litigants
seeking refuge behind this doctrine have met with little success. The Supreme
Court recently held, in the unanimous National Gerimedical decision, that the
National Health Care Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 is "not
so incompatible with antitrust concerns as to create a 'pervasive' repeal of the
antitrust laws as applied to every action undertaken in response to the health
planning process. "76
This reasoning was followed in Huron Valley Hospital Inc. v. City of Pon-
taic, 77 where the Sixth Circuit ruled that the authority granted to state plann-
ing agencies under the Federal Health Planning Act to review new hospital con-
struction does not impliedly repeal antitrust law oversight of the hospital
marketplace. The court in Huron Valley also rejected an implied repeal defense.
Overcoming the defendant's assertion that antitrust law was inapplicable to CON
process activities, the court found that the predatory practices of certain hospitals
preventing the issuance of plaintiff's CON were subject to antitrust oversight.
71 No. 84-480, 53 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Sept. 24, 1984).
72 See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States
v. National Ass'n of Security Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
73 National Ass'n of Security Dealers, 422 U.S. at 719-20.
74 Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963)).
71 Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.
76 452 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). The Court held that defendant Blue Cross'
refusal to grant participating status to hospitals that had not obtained approval for con-
struction from the local health planning agency was neither compelled nor approved
by any governmental regulatory body, but was rather a voluntary decision on the part
of such hospitals.
77 666 F.2d at 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Similarly, in White & White Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 7 the court
held that a Medicare regulation that permits hospitals to engage in the group
purchasing of supplies as a form of prudent buying does not conflict with federal
antitrust laws, and hence held that no repeal would be implied.
7
^The Supreme Court, however, cautioned in National Gerimedical that "our
holding does not foreclose future claims of antitrust immunity in other factual
contexts... where, for example, a [state health planning agency] has expressly
advocated a form of cost saving cooperation among providers, it may be that
antitrust immunity is necessary to make the [federal health planning statutes]
work." 80 Citing National Gerimedical, the Fourth Circuit, in Hospital Building
Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital," held that when health care providers par-
ticipate in local planning activities, they are immune from antitrust attack if
their activites are in good faith and aimed at avoiding needless duplication of
health care resources. 82 This implied immunity does not require a finding that
the health care defendants were compelled to engage in the challenged activity,
said the court, but only that the health care statute "encouraged" such participa-
tion in the planning process. 83 The Fourth Circuit reversed a jury verdict in favor
of plaintiff and ordered a new trial on jury instructions concerning implied im-
munity and Noerr-Pennington immunity. 4 The Supreme Court denied plain-
tiff's petition for certiorari.
On retrial, the appellate court found that both state and federal authorities
had advocated health care planning, that federal legislation encouraged coopera-
tion among governmental and private parties in planning, and that it could be
impossible to engage in such efforts without involving potential competitors
in the creation of a rational health planning scheme.85 The court was able to
distinguish Rex Hospital from National Gerimedical. In National Gerimedical,
Blue Cross' refusal to grant participating status to hospitals failing to obtain
planning agency approval for construction had not been mandated by any state
plan or agency. In Rex Hospital, the defendants participated in the local health
planning process, as contemplated by federal and state statutes. The defendants
helped fomulate a long-range plan for hospital development in the area and
opposed plaintiff's application for a CON that conflicted with the plan. Without
expanding the holdings of Silver and National Gerimedical, that the health plan-
ning statutes do not impose a blanket repeal of antitrust laws, the court in Rex
718 540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
19 Id. See also Ballard v. Blue Shield, 529 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. W.Va. 1981) (no im-
plied repeal where complaint alleged a group boycott to refuse health insurance coverage
to chiropractic services).
80 452 U.S. at 393 n.18.
81 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 231 (1983), aff'd on retrial,
No. 4048 (E.D. N.C. 1984).
82 691 F.2d at 685-86.
83 Id. at 686.
84 See infra text accompanying notes 94-99.
85 691 F.2d at 685.
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Hospital found that health planning statutes do repeal antitrust laws to the ex-
tent that potential antitrust defendants participate in the health planning pro-
cess in good faith.
86
The Fourth Circuit appeared to reinforce its holding in Rex Hospital when
it handed down its decision in North Carolina v. P.I.A. Ashville Inc.87 There,
the court found that a merger was exempt where a CON authorizing it had
been obtained. However, after a rehearing, the same court reversed the lower
court holding and its own affirmance of that holding, finding no implied repeal
or state action88 to immunize the defendant from antitrust liability. The court
noted that a change in hospital ownership did not require CON approval under
federal health planning laws.89 The court found, moreover, that no purpose
of the federal health planning statute would be furthered by failing to apply
antitrust standards to the transaction at issue (a private hospital acquisition)
and that the legislative history of that statute shows concern for permitting com-
petition to operate fully.90 Finally, the court found no clear repugnancy bet-
ween the health planning and antitrust laws, noting that the standards applicable
to the acquisition under both laws could have been satisfied.91
To date, health care providers have succeeded in advancing only health plan-
ning laws as grounds for their implied immunity from antitrust scrutiny. Never-
theless, courts appear willing to permit concerted activities that otherwise would
constitute antitrust violations, provided those activities are conducted in good
faith within the scope of established health planning law and regulations that
have the purpose of cost savings, the reduction of duplication, and the efficient
provision of health care services. The increasing efforts by state and federal
governments to control the spiraling costs of health care by means of revised
reimbursement methods 92 and stronger state health planning laws 93 suggest the
continued viability of the implied immunity doctrine as expressed in Rex
Hospital.
The recent advent of PPOs and other alternative delivery systems make their
status under state and federal health planning laws somewhat uncertain.
However, PPOs in general do not create new entities, add beds, services, or
equipment to existing entities or otherwise undertake activities ordinarily within
the purview of the health planning regulations. If a PPO is required to obtain
a CON under state law and regulations, the CON, in conjunction with other
evidence of the anticompetitive nature of a PPO, could provide some antitrust
86 Id. at 685-87.
8 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984), pet. for cert. filed, No. 84-4801 53 U.S.L.W. 3271
(U.S. Sept. 24, 1984).
8 See supra text accompanying notes 52-67.
89 740 F.2d at 276.
90 Id. at 283.
91 Id. at 284.
92 E.g., the Medicare prospective payment system. See infra note 133.
93 New York, Wisconsin and Massachusetts have all recently strengthened their CON
statutes. See MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 133, § 25B (Michie/Law. Coop. 1975 & Supp. 1985)
(amended 1982); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2802 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1984-85) (amend-
ed 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50:35 (West Supp. 1985) (amended 1981).
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protection from a challenge on the basis of concerted activities among com-
petitors in its formation or practices. It may even be advisable for the PPO
to seek the imprimatur of the state or local health planning agency before the
PPO is constituted, particularly in areas where the creation of a PPO involves
a large proportion of area providers and may have an adverse impact on those
providers not involved in the PPO. This may be accomplished through the for-
mal CON process or by insertion of the proposed PPO into the state or local
health plan. These steps could protect the PPO from antitrust risk under the
National Gerimedical and Rex Hospial decisions. It is important to note that
a petition for certiorari has been filed with the Supreme Court in P.I.A. Ashville
in an effort to obtain a dispositive solution to the tension between the health
planning and antitrust laws.
4. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
This doctrine provides that concerted efforts to persuade a government body
or official to take a specific action are not antitrust violations. The doctrine
is based on the right of the government to obtain the information it needs to
act and on the constitutional right of individuals to petition the goverment. 94
Actions within the doctrine's scope are protected even if based on anticompetitive
motives. The doctrine extends to efforts to persuade legislative bodies and courts,
as well as administrative agencies; however, the doctrine does not protect "sham"
efforts to affect governmental policy. 95 Collective efforts to exert undue or im-
proper influence on decision makers are not protected from antitrust scrutiny,
nor are filings of frivolous litigation or commencing administrative proceedings
merely to harrass competitors.9 6 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine appears to have
limited application to alternate delivery systems such as PPOs. However, in
Rex Hospital, the doctrine was applied to the defendant hospitals' involvement
in the CON process pursuant to state health planning law and regulations. Those
concerted activities, arguably violations of antitrust law, were found by the
court to be immune from antitrust risk under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
as well as the doctrine of implied immunity, discussed earlier. 9 7
14 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
145 (1961) (where railroad association carried out misleading advertising campaign to
promote legislation disadvantageous to truckers, held that first amendment protected
such speech, even though anticompetitive in motive); United Mine Workers v. Penn-
ington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965) (attempt by mine operators and union to influence
Secretary of Labor to set minimum wage at level exclusionary to small contractors held
to be protected speech).
" California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 510 (1972) (creating
the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, applicable when administrative
procedures are used for the purpose of eliminating competition).
96 See, e.g., Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (1980) (repetitive sham
litigation constituted an antitrust violation under sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine).
9' 691 F.2d at 688. See supra text accompanying notes 72-92.
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The reach of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should not be overstated
however. Advocacy is clearly protected; however, actions designed to achieve
those same ends may not be shielded. In Virginia Academy of Clinical
Psychologists v. Blue Shield,98 two insurers were charged with antitrust viola-
tions for refusing to pay for services provided by clinical psychologists unless
they were billed through physicians. A state law required direct payment, but
defendants argued that they were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine because they sought a judicial test of the statute. The Fourth Circuit ruled
in favor of plaintiffs, stating that "[tIhe collaboration in defiance of a statute
may have been calculated to provoke a judicial resolution ... but it amounted
to no more than an agreement to persist in economically restricting commer-
cial activity in the face of a state law designed to open up the health care
market." 99 Thus, while the defendants' rights to urge the repeal of the challeng-
ed statute may have been protected under Noerr-Pennington, their continued
violation of the statute was not protected. Under this analysis, if an entity seeking
to create a PPO requests that a state or local health planning agency include
the organization in its health plan, the request should be protected under Noerr-
Pennington. The actual PPO formation and its activities, however, may not
be protected from antitrust scrutiny; such exemption depends on the applicability
of other antitrust defenses such as implied repeal or state action.
5. The McCarran-Ferguson Exemption
The McCarran-Ferguson Act °00 exempts the "business of insurance" from an-
titrust scrutiny to the extent that such business is regulated by state law, pro-
vided the challenged acts do not constitute "boycott, coercion, or intimida-
tion."1 1 The McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, does not exempt from federal
antitrust regulation all activities of insurance companies, as all acts of insurance
companies are not considered to be the "business of insurance." The Supreme
Court has held that not all aspects of a third-party provider contract are within
the McCarran-Ferguson Act antitrust exemption. In Group Life & Health In-
surance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 102 the Supreme Court, in 1979, found that price
fixing between Blue Shield and participating pharmacies did not involve an in-
surance relationship between insurer and insured. Blue Shield's prepaid prescrip-
tion drug policy entitled insureds of Blue Shield to purchase drugs from any
pharmacy, and Blue Shield had entered into agreements with some pharmacies
to provide pharmaceutical products. If the insured purchased pharmaceuticals
from a participating pharmacy, the insured paid only two dollars, the policy
deductible. If the insured used a nonparticipating pharmacy, however, the in-
sured was required to pay the full price and then was reimbursed to the extent
of seventy-five percent of the price exceeding the two dollar deductible. Blue
98 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1980).
99 624 F.2d at 482.
1- 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976).
101 Id. at § 1013(b).
102 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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Shield argued that the price fixing was directly related to its relationship with
each insured because it encouraged cost containment and resulted in reduced
premiums. The Court, however, held that the contracts between the Blue Shield
plan and the participating pharmacists were not the business of insurance and
consequently were not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 10 3 The Court, in a five-
to-four decision, limited the "business of insurance" exemption to insurance con-
tracts between insurers and insureds, risk spreading activities, and practices
limited to entities within the insurance industry.1 14
Having found no McCarran-Ferguson exemption applicable to Royal Drug,
the Supreme Court remanded the case for trial on the merits. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court decision that the prepayment plan constituted neither
horizontal nor vertical price fixing.105 It found no horizontal combination
because the agreements between the group insurer and the participating phar-
macies did not run between competitors in either the pharmaceutical or insurance
industries. The court did not find vertical price fixing since there was no evidence
that Blue Shield had monopoly power or, if it did, that such power had been
abused.106 Absent such evidence, the court held, Blue Shield had the right to
bargain for the lowest price for itself and its insureds. The court further found
no boycott to exist, since each pharmacy had the opportunity to participate
in the plan, there was no evidence that Blue Shield conspired with other in-
surance companies, and Blue Shield did not limit the ability of nonparticipating
pharmacies to deal with other insurers or the general public. 107
The typical PPO structure is in many ways analogous to the situation in Royal
Drug. In Royal Drug, insureds were given a financial incentive to use "prefer-
red" pharmacists. No such incentive existed for using a nonparticipating phar-
macy, although insurance indemnification was nonetheless available for the use
of those pharmacies as well. In a PPO model, subscribers are encouraged through
economic incentives to use the participating providers. Although PPO
subscribers may use other providers, they do not obtain the same economic
benefits.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption appears to be inapplicable to PPOs
on two grounds. First, the specific scheme described in Royal Drug, which may
be analogized to the typical PPO structure, is not the "business of insurance"
under the Court's ruling in that case. Second, even if the Court had determined
that the Royal Drug scheme was the "business of insurance," PPOs should not
meet the general criteria rendering a plan "insurance" as described later.108 Never-
theless, the decision on the merits in Royal Drug provides significant comfort
to PPO organizers.
103 Id. at 214.
104 Id. at 211, 215-16, 220-21.
105 Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984),
pet. for cert. filed, No. 84-804, 53 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1984).
106 737 F.2d at 1436-37.
107 Id. at 1438.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
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6. Antitrust Compliance
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the numerous potential antitrust
hazards for the ill-conceived and/or poorly structured PPO. Antitrust lawsuits
may be filed by the federal or state governments or by individuals or entities
aggrieved by the allegedly unlawful activity. In the few instances where govern-
mental bodies have been asked to review PPO structures for possible antitrust
violations, the agencies have found no significant antitrust problems. The PPO
arrangements presented to them have been deemed generally procompetitive
and lacking in those features, discussed above, which could serve as the basis
for antitrust litigation.109 Nevertheless, government agencies may revise their
opinions as to the antitrust implications of PPOs as the PPO entities evolve.
Agency opinions are merely advisory and should not be viewed as controlling
legal precedent. Regardless of favorable opinions by government agencies,
private litigants may file lawsuits against PPOs for alleged anticompetitive
activities.
Therefore, it is advisable for creators of PPOs to have legal counsel under-
take a thorough antitrust audit to illuminate possible antitrust problem areas.
Counsel for the PPO should also assist the organization in preparing an anti-
trust compliance manual and in implementing an antitrust compliance program.
The manual, together with an instructive program, should highlight areas of
antitrust concern and provide the Board and the officers of the PPO with systems
for avoiding or reducing antitrust liability.
III. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
A. Insurance
1. Licensure Requirements
A major issue confronting PPO organizers involves the determination of
whether the organization is subject to regulation and licensure as an insurance
company under state law. If the PPO is deemed to be an insurance company,
the organizers must weigh the cost and expense of compliance with insurance
laws against the expected benefits of the PPO.
The licensing and regulation of insurance companies often call for the
maintenance of certain levels of financial reserves by the regulated entity, strictly
regulates the form and content of health care provider and subscriber
agreements, prescribes forms of investments by the regulated entity, and im-
poses other forms of control intended to protect the subscribers, enrollees, or
insureds of such an entity. 10 The threshold question for this analysis is generally
109 See Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinion to Health Care Management
Associates, 101 F.T.C. 1014 (1983); Department of Justice Business Review Letters to
Health Care Management Associates and to Hospital Corporation of America (September
21, 1983); Opinion of Ohio Attorney General, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65, 796 (1983).
110 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624-51 (West 1984).
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whether the proposed PPO would constitute or give rise to a "contract of in-
surance" under state law. States describe a contract of insurance in different
ways.11 Although PPOs frequently perform functions traditionally allocated
to insurance companies, such as claims administration, they generally do not
undertake the indemnification of patients for health care benefits, or the under-
writing or spreading of risks. Still, utilization controls imposed by a PPO, in-
cluding a possible fee-retention system as a method of spreading risk, should
be assessed under relevant state insurance laws to determine whether this con-
stitutes risk spreading for insurance regulatory purposes.
PPOs frequently incorporate billing, claim processing, and other ad-
ministrative services. A variety of jurisdictions require that insurance claims
adjusters and persons performing various other functions relating to the sale,
interpretation, and administration of insurance contracts be licensed. 112 At least
ten jurisdictions require the registration of third party contract administrators. 113
Therefore, PPO organizers must assess whether their staff requires licensure
before doing business in each state.
2. Freedom of Choice; Antidiscrimination
If the PPO is classified as an insurance company for state law purposes, there
are two categories of insurance laws and regulations that pose significant pro-
blems to PPOs: "freedom of choice" statutes, which prohibit insurers from
limiting a beneficiary's selection to only certain providers, and antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, which prohibit insurers from reimbursing providers at different
levels. For example, freedom of choice provisions in various states provide that
"the policy may not requires that the service be rendered by a particular hospital
or person .'114 The insurance law of some states prohibits interference by any
other person with the exercise of free choice in the selection of a physician or
optometrist."' In Utah, regulations require that any physician who desires to
participate in a PPO health insurance program under the program's terms must
"I For example, Mississippi defines "insurance" as an agreement by which one par-
ty for a consideration, promises to pay money or its equivalent, or to do some act of
value to the assured, upon the destruction, loss, or injury of something in which the
assured or other party has an interest, as an indemnity therefore. Miss. CODE ANN. §
83-5-5 (1972). Under Georgia law it is defined as a "contract which is an integral part
of a plan for distributing individual losses whereby one undertakes to indemnify another
or to pay a specified amount or benefits upon determinable contingencies." GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-1-2 (1982).
112 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626 (West 1984), GA. CODE ANN., §§ 33-23-2 (1982).
113 Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
Tennessee and Utah. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-485 (West 1982-83 Supp.).
114 This language is typical of many state statutes including those of Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming. See, e.g., KEN. REV. STAT. §
304.18-048 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.531 (1979).
"I E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-138b (1982).
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be allowed to do so. 116 If PPOs were deemed to fall within the state insurance
laws, the freedom of choice provisions would certainly constrain their develop-
ment. An attractive feature of PPO arrangements is that subscribers retain the
freedom to use any provider, although incentives are given for the use of the
preferred providers.
Antidiscrimination laws erect a different and potentially more difficult bar-
rier to PPO creation. Such laws generally provide that a payor may not vary
the reimbursement level for a covered expense based on the provider of the ser-
vice or on any other discriminatory basis. A number of states have statutes
that prohibit insurers from paying different rates to different health care pro-
viders, and others prohibit hospitals from charging different rates to different
payors unless they can establish that the differences are cost justified. 1 17 Such
statutes necessarily restrict the organization and operation of most PPOs.
However, several states have adopted statutes or regulations that expressly
permit the contractual arrangements contemplated by PPOs to provide discounts
only for the services of preferred providers.'18 Soon after Blue Cross/Blue Shield
developed and introduced its preferred provider program, Minnesota adopted
legislation to permit different benefits for covered services obtained from
designated providers, thus avoiding the unlawful discrimination or rebating pro-
blems. 119 In Virginia, the law effectively barred development of preferred pro-
vider arrangements. When it became clear that Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Virginia was interested in developing such an arrangement, the Virginia
legislature quickly enacted the necessary legislation clarifying the authority of
the Virginia Plans and Commercial Insurers to develop and offer such ar-
rangements. 12 0
Careful analysis of the insurance laws and regulations of each state is necessary
to determine whether freedom of choice or antidiscrimination provisions per-
tain. Where such provisions exist, it may be difficult or impossible to establish
116 UTAH INS. DEPT. REGS. Reg. 81-2 § 4 (1981).
117 See, e.g., Wyoming S.B. 101, Chap. 63, which requires that any hospital dis-
counts, credits, rebates or other related reductions in price given by a tax-supported
state or county hospital or other health care facility be applied uniformly to all persons.
See also Colorado H.B. 1330 and Iowa H.B. 519 (both proposed legislation).
"I Such states include California, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Utah,
Virginia and Wisconsin. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11,512 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.6371-.6691 (West 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-7-1 (West Supp. 1984-85);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20(15) (West Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 38.1-347.2, 38.1-813.4
(Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 628.36 (West Supp. 1984-85).
119 Minnesota H.B. 765 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN § 72A.20(15) (West Supp.
1985)).
120 Virginia S.B. 110, Chap. 464 (1983 Session) (codified at VA. CODE §§ 38.1-347.2
and 38.1-813.4 (1984)). See also Florida S.B. 28-B FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6371-.6691
(West 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-7-1 (West Supp. 1984-85); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 628.36
(West Supp. 1984-85). Legislation is also under consideration in Arizona, Colorado, Kan-
sas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ver-
mont and Washington. See generally State Regulation of Preferred Provider Organiza-
tions: A Survey of State Statutes (American Hospital Association, March 1984).
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PPOs along traditional structural formulas. However, recent experience has in-
dicated that those states that wish to encourage such alternative delivery systems
have enacted the laws necessary to permit PPO formation.12 1
3. HMO Regulations
Creators of PPOs must determine whether the organization would be suffi-
ciently similar to a health maintenance organization (HMO) to place it within
the class of entities regulated pursuant to state HMO law. The law of one jurisdic-
tion defines a "health care plan" as
any plan whereby any person undertakes to provide, arrange for, pay
for, or reimburse any part of the cost of any health care services, pro-
vided, however, a part of such plan consists of arranging for or the
provision of health care services, as distinguished from indemnifica-
tion against the cost of such service, on a prepaid basis through in-
surance or otherwise.
12 2
The relevant statute then defines an HMO as "any person who arranges for
or provides a health care plan to enrollees on a prepaid basis.
' 12 3
Arguably, PPOs "arrange for" the provision of health care services. Never-
theless, PPOs generally do not provide or arrange for the provision of health
care services on a prepaid basis, thus avoiding establishment of the PPO as the
indemnitor for the care rendered to beneficiaries. A careful analysis of each state
HMO statute is required to avoid inadvertently becoming subject to state regula-
tion as an HMO.
B. Health Planning Laws and Regulations
The application of state health planning laws and regulations to a PPO
depends on each state's definition of "health care provider." Ordinarily, PPOs
constitute a contractual arrangement among separate independent entities in-
cluding providers, payors, and subscribers. It is unlikely that the mere contract-
121 On January 24, 1985, Rep. Ron Wyden re-introduced H.R. 733, entitled "A Bill
to Permit Group Health Care Payors to Provide for Alternative Rates with Providers
of Health Care." 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H 167. The bill, presently before
the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee, provides that group health plan payors, with the agreement of group policyholders
and subject to the terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreement, may limit
payments under their policies to services procurred from health care providers charging
alternative rates. Section 2(a)(1) of H.R. 733 permits group health plan payors to negotiate
and contract for alternative rates of payment with, or determine alternative rates of pay-
ment for, providers of health care services and in turn offer the benefit of such alter-
native rates to their beneficiaries selecting such providers. Section 2(b) states that payments
with respect to group health plan beneficiaries by the payor of alternative rates under
2(a)(1) and 2(a)(2) shall not constitute a violation of any state law or regulation. This
bill therefore supresedes state freedom of choice and antidiscrimination laws and per-
mits such practices in an effort to encourage the formation of PPOs.
122 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.02(h) (Vernon 1981).
123 Id. art. 20A.02(j).
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ing process will require that a CON be obtained for approval of the new enti-
ty. However, where additional services are provided, or where services, beds,
or equipment may be reallocated among the various entities of the PPO, state
CON law may require that such activity be reported or perhaps even delayed
pending agency approval.
Most CON laws currently apply to capital expenditures made by, through,
or on behalf of, a hospital, nursing home, or other health care provider.'24 Some
states define provider to include free standing, nonacute care facilities such as
chemical dependency units and outpatient rehabilitation facilities.125 Where a
PPO maintains any control over a capital expenditure that would ordinarily
require the hospital incurring the expense to obtain a CON, the PPO itself may
be required to obtain the CON. In addition, state statutes must be reviewed
to insure that a hospital's capital contribution to the PPO in the form of start-
up costs or additional payments to the corporation for capital purposes is not
a capital expenditure that must be reported to or approved by state health plan-
ning agencies.
A proposed PPO may command such substantial market power or have such
a significant impact on the area's health care delivery system that state and local
health planning bodies may wish to or may be required to include the propos-
ed PPO in their health plans. As noted above, this may also serve to immunize
the PPO from antitrust scrutiny once it is operational.126
C. State Professional Licensing Agencies; State Departments of Health
The majority of states have statutes that prohibit the corporate practice of
medicine and proscribe arrangements that constitute fee splitting, illegal dis-
counts, rebates, and referral fees in the provision of health care services. These
pitfalls can be avoided provided the contracts executed by the various compo-
nent members of the PPO do not inadvertently shift the responsibility for pro-
viding medical care from the physician and hospital providers to the PPO itself.
PPOs should not be subject to licensure or regulation under the various state
departments of health statutory mandates, because PPOs do not directly pro-
vide medical services. Operationally, the PPO should seek to insure that other
activities overseen by state health departments, such as record keeping and
reporting requirements of the providers, remain the responsibility of those pro-
viders rather than being contractually assigned to the PPO.
D. ERISA
Employers and unions are key marketing targets for PPO development. Many
medical benefit programs operated by unions and employers are those covered
124 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-21-260 to 22-21-277 (1975); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 437-439.5 (1979); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4901 to 39-4914 (Supp. 1984).
15 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-21-260(5) (1975); IDAHO CODE § 39-4903(f) (Supp. 1984).
126 See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
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by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 12 7 A PPO
entering into an agreement with a benefit plan covered by ERISA risks being
deemed, either expressly or impliedly, a fiduciary or administrator of the plan.
A plan fiduciary is responsible for managing the assets of the plan in a prudent
manner; the failure to act in accordance with fiduciary standards can result in
liability for the breach of fiduciary duties.128 A PPO found to be a fiduciary
will also be liable for the breaches of other fiduciaries named in the plan
documents. 12 9 ERISA, and the regulations spawned by the Act, include a com-
prehensive dicusssion of transactions prohibited to a fiduciary. Remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty include restitution to the plan of any losses resulting
from the breach, restoration to the plan of any profits realized by the fiduciary
through his personal use of plan assets, as well as any other equitable or legal
relief available, including the removal of the plan fiduciary. 13
The design of the PPO is not consistent with service as a plan fiduciary and
the organization should avoid such characterization. To avoid potential liability
as a fiduciary under ERISA, it is important to understand what functions could
cause a court to view the PPO as a plan fiduciary. ERISA provides that a per-
son is a fiduciary to the extent that he: exercises discretionary authority or con-
trol with respect to the management of the plan; exercises any authority or
control with respect to the management or disposition of plan assets; renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation; or has discretionary authority
or responsibility in administration.13 1
The agreement between the PPO and the employer or union covered by the
ERISA plan should provide for several elements. First, fiduciary status should
be expressly disclaimed; a clear indication that it remains the responsibility of
the employer or union to expressly name the benefit plan's fiduciary is also im-
portant. Second, the name of the actual plan administrator should be set out.
Third, it must be made explicit that the PPO does not have authority or respon-
sibility for the disposition or management of plan assets. Last, the agreement
should indemnify the PPO against any liability resulting from claims by plan
beneficiaries or others.
Although the PPO may not be a plan fiduciary, it may nevertheless be sub-
ject to the bonding requirements contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1112 if it handles
funds or other property of the plan within the meaning of the regulations pur-
suant to that section.
E. Medicare
Medicare law' 32 does not have a significant impact on the operation and
organization of a PPO. Medicare imposes "Conditions of Participation" on
137 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1982).
128 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102-04 (West Supp. 1984).
129 Id. at § 1105.
130 Id. at § 1109.
131 Id. at § 1002(21)(A).
132 Health Insurance for the Aged Act § 100 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982)).
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numerous providers, including hospitals and nursing homes; these providers,
if they seek reimbursement under the Medicare program, must meet all condi-
tions of participation. Thus far, no conditions of participation have been enacted
or proposed to govern PPOs. PPOs must be aware, however, that each pro-
vider entity that is a part of the PPO must continue to meet its own conditions
of participation under the Medicare program. Failure to do so can lead to sanc-
tions that may include decertification as a Medicare provider. That action may
have a significant impact on the provider's ability to continue to do business,
depending on the volume of its Medicare patient load, and may be cause to
terminate a provider's participation in the PPO.
In many PPO situations, the costs and income attributable to the organiza-
tion are allocated to the hospital participants. This should affect the hospital's
cost reporting methodology and may change its level of reimbursement. Each
hospital must determine which, if any, PPO costs will be allowable under
Medicare. It is important to note that many of the cost-related questions con-
cerning Medicare reimbursement to hospitals affiliated with PPOs will be
clarified by the implementation now under way of the prospective payment
system for Medicare reimbursement.1 3
F. Securities Regulation
The structure of the PPO and any other affiliated entities, such as physicians'
associations, determines whether those entities are subject to securities regula-
tion. The critical factor is whether the contribution by the hospital and the physi-
cians to the PPO or to any other corporate entity is considered the sale of a
security by the PPO or that other entity. The physicians' association is par-
ticularly susceptible to this risk if it sells stock to' a significant number of
physicians.
The sale of any interest in the PPO or related entity, or any contribution
made to a PPO or such entity, must be reviewed under federal and state securities
law and regulations to determine whether that transaction is in fact a sale of
securities. 1 3 If the transaction is a sale of securities, it gives rise to a plethora
of filing, disclosure, and publication requirements under both state and federal
schemes unless the transaction falls within an exemption. These provisions must
be analyzed prior to the formation of any PPO.'
G. Tax Considerations
Each tax exempt participant in the PPO must determine the effect of the PPO
structure on its tax exempt status. There is no Internal Revenue Service revenue
ruling specifically addressing this issue. However, in analogous fact situations,
IRS revenue rulings have generally found the tax-exempt status of hospitals to
133 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.470-.477 and 489.20-.23.
134 For the federal definition of a security see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) and SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). An example of a state securities law defini-
tion is found in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Page 1978 & Supp. 1984).
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be undisturbed. To maintain its section 501(c)(3) exemption under the Internal
Revenue Code, a hospital must be operated to serve public interests, and no
part of its net earnings may inure to the benefit of private individuals. This
area has been labeled the "inurement issue" or the "prohibitions against private
benefit and inurement." 13.5
The inurement issue frequently arises in situations where a hospital constructs
and operates a medical office building. In revenue rulings issued in 1969, the
IRS generally held that running a medical office building contributes significantly
to a hospital's operation and is therefore substantially related to the performance
of hospital tax-exempt functions. More recent private letter rulings continue
to reflect this viewpoint, despite the advent of more complex medical office
building arrangements. 136 In sustaining the hospital's tax-exempt status, the IRS
has generally held that the arrangement furthers the hospital's tax-exempt pur-
poses. An important factor in this analysis is the proximity of the office building
to the hospital's emergency room and inpatient beds; proximity attracts physi-
cians to serve in the emergency room and on the hospital staff, thereby im-
proving the health care delivery system in the community. 137
Based on these analogous factual situations, it appears that the tax-exempt
status of a hospital would not necessarily be jeopardized because of its member-
ship in a PPO. Both the impetus and effect of PPO membership is the enhance-
ment of the provision of cost-conscious medical care to the community without
detrimentally affecting the quality of that care. The hospital that joins a PPO
to improve the community health care delivery system is engaging in clearly
justifiable conduct. Any advantages that may accrue to the hospital through
the PPO arrangement can be shown to further the hospital's tax-exempt pur-
poses with respect to medical care, rather than to constitute merely a private
benefit or inurement.
Hospitals considering PPO membership should determine whether any por-
tion of the revenue generated by PPO activities will constitute unrelated business
income. The critical issue is whether the trade or business, that is, PPO-related
business, is substantially related or contributes importantly to the hospital's tax-
exempt purposes. As described above, there should be little difficulty in
establishing that PPO business is no different than other hospital business and
thus revenues so derived are not unrelated business income subject to taxation.
135 See Kenner v. Comm'r, 318 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1963); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States,
505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
136 See, e.g., LTR 8234029, 3846 (82) (P-H, 1982) (operation of medical office
building and urgent care facility are related to hospital's purpose in that greater use is
made of hospital's diagnostic facilities, admissions are easier, and proximity of doctors
to facilities increases their participation in hospital's education and research programs;
therefore, hospital's tax exempt status not affected).
137 Id.
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IV. MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Liability for medical malpractice arises where one whose duty it is to treat
the patient with the requisite standard of care, fails to meet that standard of
care, causing physical or emotional injuries.' 38 Historically, malpractice actions
brought against hospitals failed on the basis that the duty of providing proper
medical care to patients was owed by physicians, and not hospitals. During
the last several years, however, liability for medical malpractice has been ex-
tended to parties other than physicians, including hospitals. 139 This extension
of liability has evolved under several theories. First, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, hospitals have been held responsible for the negligence of
their employees, whether they be physicians, nurses, or other health practi-
tioners. 140 This doctrine provides that an employer is responsible for the acts
of its employees. 14 The doctrine of respondeat superior should not create pro-
blems for PPOs named as parties with doctors and hospitals in medical malprac-
tice litigation provided that the employer-employee relationship does not exist
between the PPO and the affiliated hospitals, physicians' associations, and
physicians.
Potentially more troublesome to a PPO is the doctrine of "corporate
negligence" which has resulted in hospitals being held liable for the medical
malpractice of their nonemployed physician staff members. Under the doctrine
of corporate negligence, hospitals have been found to owe certain duties to pa-
tients, the breach of which constitutes negligence for which plaintiff patients
have been permitted recovery in litigation against both physicians and hospitals.
Courts have determined that a hospital generally owes a duty to its patients
to insure the competency of the hospital's medical staff and to evaluate
periodically the quality of medical treatment rendered on its premises or through
use of its facilities.142 Hospitals also have the duty of exercising due care in
medical staff appointments, reappointments, and termination. 43 Hospitals
breach this duty when they fail to take reasonable steps to acquire and analyze
the information necessary to make informed choices concerning medical staff
appointments. According to the courts, the grant of staff privileges to a physi-
cian has the effect of holding that physician out as competent to practice medicine
in his field of specialization.144 At the very least, the failure of a
138 See, e.g., Cross v. Huttenlocher, 188 Conn. 204, 440 A.2d 952 (1982); P. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, 187 (5th ed. 1984).
13 See Cadilla v. Board of Medical Examiners, 26 Cal. App. 3d 961, 103 Cal. Rptr.
455 (1972); Sherman v. Board of Regents, 266 N.Y.S.2d.
140 See, e.g., Grace v. Howlett, 5 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972); Bing v. Thunig,
2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368,
54 N.W.2d 639 (1952).
141 57 C.J.S., Master and Servant § 561 (1948 & Supp. 1984).
142 See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App.3d. 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982);
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
143 Id.
144 Id.
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physician to act in a competent manner gives rise to a triable issue of fact:
whether the hospital followed the reasonable and proper procedures necessary
to ensure the quality of the medical services rendered by that physician.
The creation of a PPO should not affect the application of these doctrines
to the hospital- or (perhaps) to physicians' association entities of the PPO.
However, these theories of corporate negligence may be applied in a lawsuit
brought by a patient against the PPO or the physicians' association alleging
medical malpractice by a PPO member hospital or physician. This application
of the corporate negligence theory would be more probable if a PPO or the
physician association maintains a selection process for determining the accep-
tance of providers into the organization.
The exposure of a PPO or a physicians' association may be further increased
if they administer a quality assurance program. A patient filing a malpractice
action against a participating provider might join the PPO and the physicians'
association in the lawsuit on the theory that the PPO or physicians' association
negligently permitted the allegedly negligent provider to participate in the pro-
gram. Conversely, if the PPO or physicians' association does not screen the
credentials or monitor the quality of participating providers, plaintiffs might
allege that such oversight is the duty of the PPO and physicians' association,
and that the failure to undertake that duty constitutes negligent conduct. While
the latter scenario appears less likely, based on current case law, the expansion
of the doctrine of corporate negligence could result in litigation. Indeed, even
the appearance in PPO promotional literature of such terms as "quality care"
or "preferred providers" might be found by a court to allow plaintiffs to assume
that the PPO expressly guarantees or warrants that it offers only quality, prefer-
red care. Negligence of a participating provider may then be imputed to the
PPO based on the doctrine of corporate negligence or even perhaps on the doc-
trine of breach of contract where the PPO has failed to live up to its announced
standards.
V. PEER REVIEW
In Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, I4 s the Supreme Court held that
the use of a peer review committee to determine the reasonableness of chiroprac-
tic charges did not constitute the "business of insurance" within the meaning
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court reiterated the three criteria relevant
in determining whether a particular practice is part of the business of insurance
and found that the peer review procedure met none of the three criteria.
146
It must be noted, however, that the Court in Pireno did not indicate its opin-
ion of the legality of the underlying conduct. It merely found that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exemption from antitrust laws was not available to such conduct
145 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
146 See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
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because the conduct did not constitute the business of insurance. 147 Therefore,
while peer review functions of health care entities are not automatically im-
mune from antitrust scrutiny, they nevertheless may be found to be legal under
antitrust law. A staff report from the Federal Trade Commission concluded that
the potential for abuse in peer review by the professions "seems relatively low."148
The Pireno Court remanded the case for a full trial on the merits of the underly-
ing claim, i.e., whether the peer review process in question actually violated
antitrust laws. 149
While the final determination of the legality of peer review arrangements under
the antitrust laws must await the result of Pireno on remand, it would seem
that many such schemes should be permissible. First, notwithstanding Pireno,
peer review mandated by federal or state law may well be exempt from an-
titrust scrutiny under the implied repeal or state action doctrines discussed above.
In addition, many peer review plans should be permissible on their merits. In
the Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinion to the Iowa Dental Associa-
tion, 5 the Commission asserted that voluntary utilization and fee review are
permissible under the antitrust laws provided that the power of the physician-
controlled organization is limited to making recommendations and that ultimate
authority to pay rests elsewhere. 5 1 The Commission also suggests that a con-
sumer representative be placed on the peer review panel, that the voluntary
and advisory nature of the process be stressed, and that no preferred status be
conferred on participants or nonpreferred status conferred upon nonparticipants
in the peer review process.152
VI. STRUCTURE OF A COOPERATIVE VENTURE PPO
PPOs may be structured according to a variety of organizational models.
These include payor-based PPOs (e.g., Aetna Choice, Blue Cross/Blue Shield),
PPOs formed by entrepreneurs as brokers between payors and providers,
hospital-based PPOs, physician-based PPOs, and cooperative ventures initiated
by two or more of the participants described above (most commonly hospitals
and physicians). Each of these models has different implications and advan-
tages in terms of their functional characteristics, tax status, ability to earn and
disburse a "profit," and potential legal liability (including antitrust and regulatory
risks) as well as the financial exposure of the parties and entities involved. This
section of the Article will describe the legal structure and operation of the
cooperative venture PPO organizational model. A discussion of this PPO struc-
ture provides the opportunity to address in an operational context a significant
141 But see Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th
Cir. 1984) (underlying conduct did not violate antitrust laws).
148 Iowa Dental Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,918 (April 9, 1982) [1979-1983
Transfer Binder], FTC COMPLAINTS & ORDERS, 22, 270 [hereinafter Iowa Dental Ass'n].
149 458 U.S. at 134.
o Iowa Dental Ass'n, supra note 148.
151 Id. at 22,271.
152 Id.
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number of legal issues described in the preceding sections of this article. The
structure and function of the cooperative venture PPO may be used as guidelines
for the formation of PPOs on other models.
The cooperative venture PPO consists of one or more hospitals, one or more
physicians' assocations (PAs), and a single PPO entity (see Exhibits 1 and 2).
The PA and PPO may be for-profit or not-for-profit corporations; however,
it may be advisable for these entities to be formed as for-profit organizations.
A for-profit structure provides the traditional incentives associated with business
ventures and permits the PPO and PA to take advantage of current or future
opportunities to engage in profit-making health care related activities. The PA
in particular may be a vehicle for numerous profit-generating singular or
cooperative business ventures on behalf of or in conjunction with its members
or its affiliated hospital.
Physicians seeking to create the cooperative venture PPO with their hospital
will incorporate a PA comprising some or all of the medical staff physicians
from that hospital. Ideally, this opportunity will be offered to the entire eligi-
ble medical staff to avoid some of the antitrust pitfalls described earlier. Once
created, the PA, in conjunction with the PPO, may establish practice standards
to eliminate inefficient and less competent members.
The proponents of the cooperative venture PPO assert that the competitive
environment in the health care industry makes it imperative that hospitals and
physicians cooperate as business partners, avoiding the traditional animosity
between these groups. This PPO structure recognizes the nature and economic
independence of these groups and seeks to provide safeguards within the cor-
porate structure to assure, to the extent possible, that neither group is able to
dictate the terms of participation in the PPO to the other group. The result of
a "takeover" of the PPO by either the hospital or physician, it is theorized,
could result in the nonparticipation of the other and thus the destruction of
the PPO.
If these premises are accepted, the cooperative venture PPO should be organiz-
ed as a cooperative corporate undertaking of physicians' associations and
hospitals. The hospital and the PA should each own one half of the stock of
the PPO corporation, and each entity should elect one half of the board of direc-
tors of the PPO. These provisions, and other similar measures described here,
can safeguard the equality of ownership and of voting rights between the PA
and hospital and maintain it as a cooperative venture.
The cooperative venture PPO is a restructuring of existing entities. In this
PPO, the hospitals and physicians are shareholders in a new corporate struc-
ture and are also providers of health care in a system that rearranges functions
and incentives to provide cost-efficient, high-quality care to purchasers. This
dual role is best understood by separately describing the PPO corporate struc-
ture and the documents that create it, and the PPO operational functions and
the agreements that mandate those functions.
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A. Corporate Structure
To structure the cooperative venture PPO, certain provisions should be con-
tained in the articles of incorporation and the bylaws. As noted, the cooperative
venture PPO is to be owned and controlled equally by the hospital and PA.
Therefore, the bylaws should provide for two classes of stock, one ("Class A")
owned by the hospital or hospitals involved in the PPO, and one ("Class B")
owned by the PAs of those hospitals (see Exhibit 1).
The PPO board of directors should consist of an even number of directors,
one half elected by the holders of Class A stock, and one half elected by the
owners of Class B stock. These proposed PPO bylaws would provide that at
shareholder meetings, each class of stock would have one shareholder vote.
In this way, shareholder decisions would reflect the unanimous agreement of
both the hospital(s) and the PA(s). Similarly, the vote of fifty percent of the
full board of directors plus one director, rather than a simple majority of a
quorum, would be required to pass any resolution of the PPO directors. This
requirement could prevent the board from taking official action by the vote
of all of the directors elected by any one class of stock. For example, if the board
of directors consists of ten directors, five of whom are Class A directors and
five of whom are Class B directors, action should require the approval of six
directors. At least one director from the "other faction" must vote with the other
group in order to attain the majority-plus-one necessary for board action. Ad-
ditional protection may be secured by requiring a majority-plus-two or -three
vote for board action. In this and other provisions, the flexibility of this cor-
porate structure permits it to be adapted readily as the PPO evolves.
This corporate structure may be used to form a network of hospitals and
PAs. The same shareholder and board voting provisions, and the theory that
underlies their application to a PPO with only one hospital and PA, applies
to a network PPO as well. In a network structure, all the hospitals together
own fifty percent of the shares of the PPO, and all the PAs own fifty percent
of the PPO stock. The amount of stock in the PPO owned by each hospital
and PA is determined by the members of the respective groups by a network-
ing agreement or by the PPO. Regardless of the number of PPO shareholders,
all the owners of each class of stock elect one half of the PPO board and have
one vote in shareholder matters (see Exhibit 2).
All the hospitals and PAs affiliated with the proposed network PPO should
execute a PPO shareholder agreement to further secure the equal ownership
of each group in the organization. The shareholder agreement should restrict
the transferability of shares of stock in the PPO. The PPO shareholder agree-
ment provides that where the PPO consists of multiple hospitals or PAs (Ex-
hibit 2), the hospital or PA wishing to terminate or being terminated may sell
its interest in the PPO only to another member of its PPO shareholder group
(i.e., a hospital may sell only to a hospital and a PA only to a PA). It may
not sell to a third party, to a member of the other provider group, or to the
PPO itself.
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There are two basic purposes for these restrictions. First, they prevent one
hospital or PA in the network from transferring its ownership interest in the
PPO to an entity that may be incompatible with the quality, standards, reputa-
tion, or ethical requirements of the other shareholder hospitals or PAs in the
PPO. Second, if the shareholders could freely transfer their interest, the equal
balance maintained between hospitals and PAs in the ownership of the PPO
would be destroyed.
Each physician desiring to purchase stock in the PA would execute a PA
shareholder agreement. The PA shareholder agreement should restrict the
transferability of shares of stock in the PA to prevent a physician from transfer-
ring his interest in the PA to a physician who may be unable to meet the stand-
ards of the PA or the PPO. The PA shareholder agreement provides that the
physician shall cease to be a shareholder and a member of the PA upon the
occurrence of any one of the following: failure to comply with the PPO's quality
review and utilization management program (based upon objective standards);
desire to transfer ownership of PA shares; loss of medical license; loss of hospital
staff membership; or failure to pay dues. In the event of any of the above, the
shareholder agreement provides that the PA shall redeem the share of PA stock
owned by that physician.
B. PPO Functions
As described above, the legal structure of the PPO is significant in ensuring
the continued viability of the cooperative venture in the face of potential con-
flicts and jealousies among the economically powerful and traditionally indepen-
dent health care providers that constitute the PPO. Equally important is the
proper allocation of the numerous PPO functions among the organization's
various entities. Establishing an effective operational framework for the PPO
entity is critical to providing cost-efficient, high-quality health care to the con-
sumer (which is the product a PPO has to sell), as well as to reducing or
eliminating the PPO's exposure to legal liability. The functions and obligations
of the entities comprising the PPO are set forth and described in the provider
agreements and service agreements executed by and among those entities. The
provider agreements and service agreements are essential to the operation of
the PPO. The PPO cannot offer to provide a managed health care plan unless
the providers are in place within a structure that operates efficiently.
In general, a PPO is created to provide economic incentives to consumers
to utilize the provider members of the PPO. These incentives, usually in the
form of reduced deductibles and copayments for patients, reduced costs to
payors, and increased efficiencies and claims management for providers, are
established by aggressively containing the cost of care provided by the members
of the PPO. This is accomplished through intensive and ongoing quality review
and utilization management. The PPO implements these controls by enlisting
and retaining cost-conscious health care providers, while avoiding or terminating
inefficient providers. One of the central functions of the PPO, therefore, is to
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implement the quality review and utilization program necessary to the viabili-
ty of the PPO and to acquire and analyze quality, charge, utilization, and fee
data from billing and patient records as part of that program. The PPO then
uses the information to develop and administer the services provided by the
physician and hospital members of the PPO, referred to as the "PPO-managed
health care plan."
The cooperative venture PPO provides physicians and hospitals with a power-
ful structure for negotiating separate agreements with each potential payor. In
addition, the flexibility of the cooperative venture PPO permits the organiza-
tion or its member hospitals and physicians to enter into agreements with payors
based on a set plan separately negotiated with each health care provider; an
alternate agreement is one in which the providers receive customary fees but
with utilization controls superimposed upon their services. Regardless of the
PPO structure or the method of contracting, it is advisable, from both an an-
titrust and operational standpoint, for the PPO to retain the option of submit-
ting any payor agreement negotiated by the PPO to each hospital and physi-
cian in the organization for their acceptance or rejection. Ultimately, the PPO
structure and method of contracting with payors must be determined by the
specific organizational dynamics and requirements of the parties forming the
PPO.
The PPO acts as the agent for the hospitals and physicians (represented in
the PPO by the PA) that provide the services comprising the PPO managed
health care plan. The PPO negotiates the plan with potential payors (e.g., in-
surance companies, self-insured employers, union trust funds), seeking the most
favorable payment terms for its principals, the PAs and hospitals in the PPO.
Only the PPO negotiates the price of the services offered in the plan. Neither
the hospitals, the PAs, nor the physicians take part in the price negotiations
or fee determinations. In fact, no provider has access to the fee and charge in-
formation concerning any other provider used by the PPO to negotiate price
with the payor. The PPO would negotiate separately with each payor and would
be prepared to negotiate separately the price of each service offered in the plan.
These steps are strongly recommended as ways to significantly reduce the PPO's
exposure to allegations of antitrust violations based on unlawful price fixing,
discussed earlier.153
When the negotiations result in a proposed contract, the PPO would submit
that contract to the PA(s) and hospital(s). The PAs in turn submit the contract
to each physician member. Allegations of price fixing are more likely if individual
providers are required to accept whatever arrangement was negptiated by the
PPO with the payor. Therefore, each physician and each hospital should have
the option to accept or reject any contract negotiated by the PPO with any
payor. The only contracting parties are the payor and provider; they do not
include the PPO or PA. It is contemplated that a contract will not be im-
plemented without some threshold number of provider acceptances. The op-
tion retained by each provider to accept or reject a payor contract is critical
153 See supra text accompanying note 8-29.
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in the attempt to prevent antitrust liability. It is also critical for the providers
themselves to avoid establishing or appearing to establish a set fee for purposes
of negotiation with a payor. For this reason it is suggested that the PPO, using
fee and pricing information obtained from PPO member and nonmember physi-
cians alike, negotiate with each payor reasonable fees for particular medical
services. The incorporation of the PPO as a separate entity is all the more im-
portant from an antitrust standpoint where the PPO is negotiating fees and
charges on behalf of the hospital and physician providers.
Under the operation of the cooperative venture PPO, each patient would be
free to obtain services from "nonpreferred" providers who are not members
of the PPO, albeit at a higher cost. This prevents further antitrust problems
and avoids violation of "freedom of choice" laws that may exist under state
insurance codes. The patients' ability to use any provider they wish, coupled
with the fact that the providers are paid on the traditional fee-for-service basis
rather than through a prepaid mechanism, preclude consideration of the PPO
as an HMO for purposes of state HMO statutes. In addition, the PPO should
not be subject to state insurance law if it does not indemnify or reimburse any
party to the venture or spread the risk of loss over the PPO members. Therefore,
payment should be made directly by the payor to the provider based upon the
provider's claim filed with the payor.
Antitrust problems may also arise if a physician is rejected for or terminated
from membership in the PA. It is therefore recommended that the PPO, com-
posed of representatives of all the provider groups as well as nonproviders, have
the ultimate decision with regard to the termination or rejection of a provider's
application for PPO membership rather than place that decision in the hands
of fellow providers. Rejection of one physician by other physicians for PA
membership strongly suggests an intent to boycott or monopolize patient care
or to refuse to deal with that rejected applicant based upon subjective criteria
not reasonably related to the business goals of the PPO venture.
Physicians' association membership decisions made by a panel of objective,
disinterested PPO representatives applying a set of uniform standards and criteria
will be less vulnerable to antitrust sanction. Certain criteria are relatively free
from controversy, such as licensing, staff membership, and other related stand-
ards. However, the PPO may also establish criteria related to cost efficiencies,
quality of care, the need for certain specialties and not for others, the limita-
tions of the physical facilities of PPO member providers, and other similar re-
quirements. These criteria may survive antitrust scrutiny if they are related to
a valid business goal and not established to exclude certain practitioners or
groups of practitioners. As the PPO market share increases, the PPO must be
especially sensitive to the need for such criteria to be objective, unbiased, and
not overtly anticompetitive.
The cooperative venture PPO's presumed objectivity makes it appropriate
for the organization to administer grievances between the various parties to
the PPO venture: patients against providers, providers against payors, providers
against patients. The PPO could create an administrative staff with an executive
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director. The funds for operating the PPO should be derived from the capitaliza-
tion of the PPO by its hospital and PA shareholders. However, a particularly
efficient PPO, that is, one whose members provide cost effective care, may be
able to negotiate agreements under which payors would provide a portion of
the PPO's operating expenses.
The functions of the member hospitals under the model PPO are set forth
in the service agreements between and among the hospitals and the PPO. The
hospitals would agree to provide the covered services to eligible persons pur-
suant to the payor agreements negotiated by the PPOs and accepted by the
hospital. The hospitals accept the amount negotiated in the payor agreement
as full payment for the services provided to the eligible patient. The hospitals
agree to treat PPO patients in the same manner as they treat all other patients
and to accept or reject PPO patients only on the basis of the same criteria
employed for other patients. Significantly, the hospitals would agree to accept
and implement the PPO's quality review and utilization management program
which is central to insuring the cost effectiveness of the PPO venture. In order
for the PPO to negotiate the payors and implement the quality review and utiliz-
tion management program, the hospital would agree to provide the PPO with
all necessary records and information that are in its possession. The hospital's
failure to adhere to any provision in its service agreement with the PPO could
be grounds for termination of its membership in the organization pursuant to
the terms of the proposed shareholder agreement.
The functions of the PA are set forth in the service agreement between the
PA and the PPO. It is proposed that the PPO's obligation to monitor and con-
trol the provision of office-based physicians' services to be contracting patients
be implemented by the PA. The PA would develop and enforce practice-related
membership criteria for the PA, but it is recommended that the final decision
to terminate the participation of any provider should reside with the PPO. As
noted earlier, it is the independence and objectivity of the PPO that enables
it to make decisions to terminate PA membership without engendering antitrust
liability.
The PA would cooperate in the resolution of grievances filed pursuant to the
grievance procedure of the PPO; it is suggested, however, that the PPO render
the final decision on any grievance filed by any party. The PA would provide
the PPO with a current list of all physician providers and the location where
such providers perform services pursuant to payor contracts. Like the PPO
member hospitals, the PAs would agree to provide the PPO with all records
and information necessary to enable the PPO to negotiate with payors and to
perform its administrative obligations. A PA's failure to perform any of these
functions could constitute grounds for its termination as a PPO member.
The physician providers would execute a provider agreement with their PA.
In addition to performing many of the functions that the hospitals must per-
form, each physician would notify the PA and the PPO of any eligible persons
whose behavior jeopardizes the efficient rendering of services by the PPO. Each
physician would, within the dictates of good medical practice and in the best
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interest of his patients, attempt to refer PPO patients to other physican pro-
viders who are members. To avoid problems both with antitrust law and with
standards governing the ethical practice of medicine, the proposed referral pro-
vision would be worded in an advisory rather than mandatory fashion. Each
physician member of the PPO would be required to carry insurance at limits
set by the PPO. As with hospitals and PAs, any violation of the recommended
provider agreement between the physician and the PA, or any violation of the
physician's obligations under the service agreement between the PA and the
PPO should be grounds for terminating the physician's membership in the
association.
In addition to the advantages describe above, the foregoing structure and
operation of the model cooperative venture PPO may provide other legal
benefits. For example, it is proposed that no provider be an employee of the
PPO. The stockholder/independent contractor relationship of providers to the
PA and PPO, evidenced by the existence of shareholder and service agreements
and the absence of employment contracts or any other indicia of employment,
would shield the PPO from professional negligence liability arising from the
alleged malpractice of PPO member physicians or hospitals. This does not pre-
vent liability from being imposed on a PPO for the professional negligence of
its member providers. Indeed, as discussed above, courts are becoming more
sympathetic to claims of "corporate negligence," where an institution fails to
properly supervise or negligently grants privileges to a physician who then com-
mits medical malpractice. 11 Nevertheless, the cooperative venture PPO struc-
ture provides the PPO with additional insulation against such claims.
As noted earlier, a PPO may take myriad forms. The PPO concept is suffi-
ciently novel that no one particular corporate structure has emerged as clearly
superior to any other structure. The PPO organization described in this section
is relatively detailed and contains certain requirements intended to protect the
venture from legal liability. However, regardless of what form it takes, a suc-
cessful PPO must retain the flexibility necessary to respond to the changes that
are constantly occurring in the health care industry, and the resulting oppor-
tunities for the members of that industry.
I" See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
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